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A Transnational Law of the Sea
Josh Martin

Abstract
It is widely accepted that we are presently struggling to govern the vast expanse of the ocean
effectively. This Article finally gets to the real cause of much of the failures of the law of the sea:
Westphalian sovereignty. In particular, it evidences that certain features of our obstinate model
of public international law—such as sovereign exclusivity, equality, and territoriality—can be
linked with a large majority of the governance “gaps” in the global ocean context. It thereby
exonerates the falsely accused Grotius’s mare liberum doctrine and flag state regulation, which
both still continue to receive an unmerited level of condemnation. This Article also argues that
worldwide searches for new integrated systems of ocean management are, in fact, a search for a
new paradigm of governance, well-known among lawyers, but yet to be thoroughly analyzed in
the law of the sea context, that of transnational law and governance. The study supports this
conclusion by showing that two principal features of a transnational law of the sea—in the form
of multi-stakeholder participation and multi-level governance—have already proven essential in
ameliorating many of the routine weaknesses in our present international system of ocean
governance.
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I. A DDRESSING THE L EGAL S YSTEM ; N OT J UST THE L EGAL
R ULES
The law of the sea is failing. Wherever one looks, whether it be ecosystem
damage and biodiversity decimation, overfishing, seabed trawling, coral
destruction, human rights abuses, human trafficking, piracy, smuggling, crime,
wreck looting, noise pollution, land-based pollution, vessel-source pollution,
health and safety failures, or major maritime disasters, one can witness recurring
deficiencies in regulatory oversight.1 In consideration of the ocean’s ecological,
social, economic, and cultural value, this increasing visibility of poor regulatory
management has led to a recent proliferation of research dedicated to improving
our protection of the seas. For example, in 2001, an expert international
committee submitted a report that at the turn of the twentieth century, “the state
of the world’s seas and oceans [was] deteriorating.”2 Furthermore, “most of the
problems identified decades ago have not been resolved, and many are
worsening.”3 Twenty years later, things still have not changed.
As James Harrison said in 2017:
[A]s the twentieth century progressed, the rapid industrialization of the
oceans has meant that any lingering belief that the seas were “inexhaustible”
gave way to a growing sense of crisis. This trend has continued to the extent
that, today, there are warning signs that the oceans are at tipping point, owing
to the impacts of pollution and other environmental stresses caused by
anthropogenic activity.4

This has led to calls from every corner of the international community to
transform our approach to ocean management away from the traditional “zonal”
system of ocean management toward a more integrated and inclusive system.5 The
development of such “Integrated Ocean Management” (IOM) processes, in
various forms, can be increasingly witnessed on local, national, regional, and global
1

2

3
4

5

See, e.g., IAN URBINA, THE OUTLAW OCEAN: CRIME AND SURVIVAL IN THE LAST UNTAMED
FRONTIER (2019); WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE, THE OUTLAW SEA: A WORLD OF FREEDOM, CHAOS,
AND CRIME (2004); TED DANSON & MICHAEL D’ORSO, OCEANA: OUR ENDANGERED OCEANS
AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO SAVE THEM (2011); KRISTINA M. GJERDE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, REGULATORY AND GOVERNANCE GAPS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF MARINE
BIODIVERSITY IN AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION (2008).
GROUP OF EXPERTS ON THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, A
SEA OF TROUBLES 1 (Geoffrey Lean et al. eds., 2001).
Id.
JAMES HARRISON, SAVING THE OCEANS THROUGH LAW: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 1 (2017) (citations omitted).
See also Karen N. Scott, Integrated Oceans Management: A New Frontier in Marine Environmental Protection,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 463, 463 (Donald R. Rothwell et al. eds.,
2015).
See Section V.
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scales.6 Additionally, many international, governmental, and non-governmental
organizations are increasingly exploring the need for a new IOM paradigm,
including the International Union for the Conservation of Nature,7 the U.N. Food
and Agricultural Organization,8 the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration,9 the World Wildlife Fund,10 the U.N. Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO),11 and the Conference of the Parties under the
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity.12 Research is also becoming more active
in the search for the precise meaning of such “integrated” systems of ocean
management, sporadically and fragmentedly spotting the need for ecosystemsbased approaches,13 stakeholder participation,14 regional governance,15 or
proposals for a more holistic system of regulation across ocean space.16
Despite these well-intended efforts, humankind is still failing to get a grip on
ocean governance. This Article demonstrates that the real root cause of this failure
is our devotion to a Westphalian system of international law. It suggests that it is
not—as has been previously suspected—the fault of Hugo Grotius’s 1609 thesis
propounding a supposed “Freedom of the Seas” or the widespread use of flag
state regulation per se. Instead, responsibility lies squarely with a dogmatic reliance
6

See generally Scott, supra note 4.

7

WORLD COMMISSION ON PROTECTED AREAS, INCORPORATING MARINE PROTECTED AREAS INTO
INTEGRATED COASTAL AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES (Charles Ehler
et al. eds., 2004).
Melanie Torrie, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Integrated Ocean Management Fisheries, Oil, Gas, and Seabed Mining, 122 GLOBEFISH RSCH. PROGRAMME 1 (2016).
U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOS Helping NOAA Serve the Nation as a
Global Leader in Integrated Management of the Ocean, https://perma.cc/6929-DBM8; U.S. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NATIONAL OCEAN SERVICE, https://perma.cc/A5LGZL82.
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, Integrated Ocean Management, https://perma.cc/X7HU-J28U.

8

9

10
11
12

13

One Planet, One Ocean, UNESCO, https://perma.cc/R9BV-FWVK.
Integrated Marine and Coastal Area Management (IMCAM), CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES ON THE
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Dec. 4, 2007), https://perma.cc/LY4G-TYSV.
Elizabeth A. Kirk, Maritime Zones and the Ecosystem Approach: A Mismatch?, 8 REV. EUR. COMP. &
INT’L ENV’T L. 67, 72 (1999); Julia A. Ekstrom et al., A Tool to Navigate Overlaps in Fragmented Ocean
Governance, 33 MARINE POL’Y 532, 532–35 (2009).

14

Heather Ritchie & Geraint Ellis, ‘A System that Works for the Sea’? Exploring Stakeholder Engagement in
Marine Spatial Planning, 53 J. ENV’T PLAN. & MGMT. 701, 701–23 (2009); Morgan Gopnik et al.,
Coming to the Table: Early Stakeholder Engagement in Marine Spatial Planning, 36 MARINE POL’Y 1139,
1139–49 (2012).

15

See generally YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, A DUAL APPROACH TO OCEAN GOVERNANCE: THE CASES OF
ZONAL AND INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (2008);
GOVERNING EUROPE’S MARINE ENVIRONMENT: EUROPEANIZATION OF REGIONAL SEAS OF
REGIONALIZATION OF EU POLICIES? (Michael Gilek & Kristine Kern eds., Routledge 2015).

16

Gabriela A. Oanta, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment as a Goal for Achieving Sustainable
Development on the Rio+20 Agenda, 16 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 214, 219 (2014); see also Section V.
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on a horizontal and inter-state system of international law in the ocean context.
As will be evidenced, the failure of the legal system to effectively steward the
oceans can really be principally linked to three different traits of Westphalian
sovereignty: exclusivity, equality, and territoriality. This Article also provides a detailed
explanation and introduction to transnational law, including an account of the
dormant lex maritima, in order to (1) highlight the richness of this field and (2)
point to its lacking connection with the search for a new paradigm of ocean
governance. Finally, it concludes with the view that we should reduce our
emphasis on sovereign rights and duties and instead recognize the prevalent and
longstanding calls to legal plurality, multi-scalarity, multi-stakeholderism, and
post-nationalism.
Section II introduces the concept of transnational law as it stands in contrast
to the Westphalian system of public international law, highlighting the worldwide
movement to recognize and encourage law beyond the state, as well as the blurring
of “public” and “private” sources and systems of law. Section III then critically
examines the public international law system that has governed ocean
management up to now, illustrating the ways in which Westphalianism can be
linked to many failures of ocean stewardship. Section IV at last exonerates the
scapegoats for failed ocean governance over the past decades—Grotius’s Mare
Liberum and the notion of flag state regulation. In fact, this Article shows that
Westphalianism itself caused both well-meaning doctrines to fail in practice.
Section V connects the search for new “integrated” models of governance in the
marine environment with the need for a model that dispenses with strict notions
of national sovereignty and horizontal intergovernmental relations. This Section
demonstrates that two features of an effective transnational system of ocean
management are: (1) the expanded governance role for multiple and varied
stakeholders and (2) the arrangement of diverse normative frameworks across
multiple geographical scales. The Article concludes by calling for a greater
recognition of the need for a transnational law of the sea.

II. I NTRODUCING T RA NSNATIONAL L AW
A. Westphalianism
Westphalian sovereignty refers to our familiar system of inter-national law
resolved during thirty years of negotiations over the Münster and Osnabrück
treaties, concluded between numerous European nations in 1648, and effectively
ending the European wars of religion—a point in history known as the “Peace of
Westphalia.”17 But most recognize that Westphalianism was not necessarily created
17

See generally Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty, 21 INT’L HIST.
R. 569 (1999); DANIEL PHILPOTT, REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY: HOW IDEAS SHAPED MODERN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 73–150 (2001).
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at this moment, but rather organically developed over many centuries around the
world.18 The overall effect was the formal legitimation of the nation-state as the
exclusive legal authority for all territorially internal matters and the understanding
that all nation-states are equal and unitary for all external matters.19
A corollary to achieving temporary peace across Europe within this
emergent multi-state system was the widespread constitutionalization of polities
and quelling of competing internal claims to power.20 International governance
between the 17th and 20th centuries thus centered on both the strengthening of
zonal political boundaries and the demarcation of sovereignty within territories—
in which monolithic states possessed absolute independence to determine their
own internal laws free from outside influence and interference.21 The evermore
rigid political borders around states and the modeling of states as entirely unitary
and equal has, over the centuries, given birth to our modern system of inter-national
law—founded upon the principle of sovereign territorial independence, the
conclusion of positive international treaties, and the resolution of customary
norms between nations.22 Today, we remain firmly within this Westphalian system
of international law and thinking.23
National sovereignty has, therefore, been at the heart of our understanding
of law and jurisprudence for several centuries. Most legal philosophers in this time
have explicated law’s basis as being positively determined by a higher authority,
whether through the canon of natural law, or as achieved functionally through the
formal use of power.24 Even as recently as the 1960s, both H.L.A. Hart’s famous
primary and secondary rules and Hans Kelsen’s Grundnorm theories espoused that
law’s ultimate source of power is derived from its production through
18

19

20
21

Croxton, supra note 17, at 570; John Gerard Ruggie, Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity:
Toward a Neorealist Synthesis, 35 WORLD POL. 261, 275–76 (1983).
See generally FRANCIS HARRY HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1986); DIETER
GRIMM, SOVEREIGNTY: THE ORIGIN AND FUTURE OF A POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONCEPT (Belinda
Cooper trans., 2015).
Croxton, supra note 17; PHILPOTT supra note 17, at 73–150.
HENRY KISSINGER, WORLD ORDER, 11–48 (2014); Marie-Laure Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin, Reordering
the World: Transnational Regulatory Governance and Its Challenges, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
GOVERNANCE 745, 746 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012).

22

JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, SOVEREIGNTY: MORAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 91 (2014);
Croxton, supra note 17; KISSINGER, supra note 21; Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia 1648–1948, 42
AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 40–41 (1948). See generally A. Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian
Assumptions of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 R. INT’L STUD. 133 (2001).

23

Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws, The United Nations: Continuity and Change, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS 30–40 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 2018); John
H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 782–
802 (2003).

24

Expressed, for example, by early scholars such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jeremy Bentham,
John Austin, and Immanuel Kant.
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foundational law-making infrastructure, invariably found in the nation-state.25
Such positivist accounts of law remain or have become—unconsciously, at least—
widely subscribed to among people today; most of us do not believe that any law
is “law” unless a nation-state formally posits it through domestic legislative and
judicial processes.26 However, as discussed below, the multiple and everintensifying processes of globalization over the past half-century have triggered a
revisiting of the positivist and nationalist account. Indeed, as will be shown, in an
increasingly transnational world, there has been movement toward more
pluralistic and sociological accounts of law, taking a broader view of law’s
underlying quality as a norm.
Whether the identification of non-state law is achieved, for example, by
Brian Tamanaha’s Labelling System,27 Armin von Bogdandy’s Systems Theory,28
Gunther Teubner’s Autopoietic Theory,29 William Twining’s Levels Theory,30 or
Gralf-Peter Calliess’s Running Code Theory,31 the direction of recent thinking has
been predominantly consonant: not all law does, nor should, originate from the
nation-state. Law can be written or unwritten, and its sources can be local,
communal, religious, supranational, or global, as well as public, private, or hybrid,
and can possess normativity on a spectrum between the extremities of hard and
soft.32 In the globalization context, such accounts of global legal pluralism open the
possibility that we can be subject to multiple legal obligations, many of which can
originate within or without the domestic legal system of the nation-state.33
Naturally, there remain traditionalists who dispute this perspective. In some ways,
25

See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012); Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law,
51 L.Q. REV. 517 (1935).

26

J. H. Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and Their Manifestation: The Operation of the International Commercial and
Financial Legal Order and Its Lex Mercatoria, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 129, 129–91 (2006); Thomas
Schultz, Some Critical Comments on the Juridicity of Lex Mercatoria, 10 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 667, 667–711
(2008).

27

Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 296, 296–321 (2000).
See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy & Sergio Dellavalle, The Lex Mercatoria of Systems Theory: Localisation,
Reconstruction and Criticism from a Public Law Perspective, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. THEORY 59, 59–82 (2012).
See generally GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).

28

29
30

WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW
PERSPECTIVE 362–75 (2009).

31

Gralf-Peter Calliess, Reflexive Transnational Law: The Privatisation of Civil Law and the Civilisation of Private
Law, 23 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 185, 185–216 (2002).

32

Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869, 869–96 (1988); Franz von BendaBeckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism, 47 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 37, 37–82
(2002). See generally LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN
DIALOGUE (Brian Z. Tamanaha et al. eds., 2012).

33

NEGOTIATING STATE AND NON-STATE LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL AND LOCAL LEGAL
PLURALISM 2 (Michael A. Hefland ed., 2015) [hereinafter NEGOTIATING STATE AND NON-STATE
LAW]; NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF
POSTNATIONAL LAW 69–108 (2010).

Winter 2021

425

FROM A

GLOBAL

Chicago Journal of International Law

the battle lines are presently drawn between the legal positivists, who maintain an
account of law built upon “national” sovereignty, and legal pluralists, who
recognize and, in many cases, actively seek to expand additional laws “beyond the
state.”34 The pluralist account has certainly been welcomed in the globalized era.35

B. Transnational Law
Over the past half-century, the pluralist account of law has
contemporaneously led to the advancement of a new discourse in transnational
law.36 Transnational law, as widely understood, seeks to comprehend and even
encourage the complex configuration of legal rules and norms, both within and
without the state.37 Its appeal lies in its pluralist recognition that numerous actors
beyond the nation-state can be a source of legal norms or the principal shapers of
the legal system.38 Whether the law takes the form of supranational regulation,
global standards derived by non-state bodies, industry self-regulation, private
dispute settlement, or community norms, all trans-nationalists recognize that
individuals are often subject to rules through a variety of compliance-inducing
forces, such as positive, moral, communal, virtual, physical, internal, or natural. 39
Yet, it is important to recognize that international law and order still remains statecentric. The vast majority of legal objects obey the legal rules of a singular
domestic legal system, whether by territorial situation, contractual choice, or
imposition through private international law, and most actors rationalize
themselves as so subject.40 As such, transnational law is more of an emerging
34

35

36

37

See generally Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State—Europeanization, Globalization,
Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 870 (2006); Peer Zumbansen, Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial
Arbitration and Transnational Law, 8 EUR. L.J. 400, 428 (2002); A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER
AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY 60 (2003).
See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority and
Private Power, 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 117–38 (2013); BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS,
TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC
TRANSITION (1995).
See, e.g., TRANSNATIONAL LAW: RETHINKING EUROPEAN LAW AND LEGAL THINKING (Miguel
Maduro et al. eds., 2014).
Id. See generally NEGOTIATING STATE AND NON-STATE LAW, supra note 33.

38

Paul Schiff Berman, The Evolution of Global Legal Pluralism, in AUTHORITY IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
THEORY: THEORISING ACROSS DISCIPLINES 151–90 (Roger Cotterrell & Maksymilian Del Mar eds.,
2016); Roger Cotterrell, What Is Transnational Law?, 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 500, 500–24 (2012); Peer
Zumbansen, Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance, and Legal Pluralism,
21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 308 (2012). See generally DETLEF VON DANIELS, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW FROM A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2010).

39

Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. R. L. SOC. SCI. 225, 225–42 (2009); Paul Schiff
Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1157–58 (2007); Paul Schiff Berman, A
Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 301–30 (2007).
See generally Dalhuisen, supra note 26.

40
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diversification and fragmentation in sources and subjects of law, rather than a
persuasive account of lex lata.41
In 1956, in his visionary introduction to transnational law, Philip Jessup
defined transnational law as “all law which regulates actions or events that
transcend national frontiers. Both public and private international law are
included, as well as other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard
categories.”42 This definition, though an early formulation, still commands an
impressive level of subscription among thinkers today.43 It also exemplifies the
potential vastness of the subject.44 Based on this idea, this Article defines
transnational law as the global legal system that recognizes and promotes all legal
norms of public, private, and hybrid origin, that vary between hard and soft and
that apply to the multiplicity of actors interacting across and between multiple
governance levels—local, national, regional, and global. In other words, both
transnational law and governance emphasize the multi-faceted, multi-level, and
multi-stakeholder nature of the global civil order and of the challenges facing it,
as well as seek to look beyond a state-based approach to law and accountability.
By contrast, the Westphalian account of international law has created an
unfortunately limited dualistic account of law: public international law, which
covers agreements between states, and municipal law, which encompasses national
law within states.45 This has resulted in the apparent neglect of a growing number
of legal norms—outside multilateral treaties and national law—which carry
normative force without sole reliance on state power, such as: (1) industry selfregulation and standards; (2) supranational law; (3) standards and rules developed
by international governmental, non-governmental or epistemic bodies; (4)
cooperation in law development and enforcement between public and private
partners; (5) other local, religious, or global standards; and (6) all forms and scales
of “governance,” between hard and soft.
Through internal enforcement mechanisms—such as peer pressure, media
scrutiny, economic sanctions, loss of trade access, diminution in consumer
demand, and loss of network access—transnational rules can drive high levels of
direct compliance by stakeholders, often being witnessed in the form of industry
41

Veerle Heyvaert, The Transnationalization of Law: Rethinking Law through Transnational Environmental
Regulation, 6 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 205, 205–36 (2017). See generally SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING
CONTROL?: SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).

42

PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956) (emphasis added).
Daniel Kalderimis, Is Transnational Law Eclipsing International Law?, in MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW
WORK IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DETLEV VAGTS 93, 98 (Pieter Bekker et
al. eds., 2010).

43

44

See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why and How to Study Transnational Law, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 97,
103–05 (2011); Cotterrell, supra note 38, at 501.

45

TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2015); JAMES
CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 48–61 (9th ed. 2019).
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standards, certification schemes, internal adjudicative processes, community
agreed rules, or other non-state derived laws. To great effect, nation-states can
also loan their domestic enforcement architecture to external private, regional, or
global legal systems in co-regulatory processes which bolster the external
network’s internal power of enforcement.46
Transnational law thus grapples with the: transition from global
“government” to “governance”;47 ongoing fragmentation of international law;48
intensifying processes of globalization;49 increased role of non-state actors in the
administration of global public governance;50 blurring between private and public
stakeholders, and public and private law, in the transboundary context;51 growing
conceptual uncoupling of states from monolithic units into complex
administrative agents;52 expanded role of transboundary normative and policy
networks;53 postcolonial recognition of the incongruity between indigenous or
traditional laws with centralized state authority;54 increasing use of negotiation,
mediation, arbitration, expert opinion, and other private mechanisms of dispute

46

See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 243; André Nollkaemper, Compliance Control in International
Environmental Law: Traversing the Limits of the National Legal Order, 13 Y.B. INT’L ENV’T L. 165, 173–
75 (2003).

47

James N. Rosenau, Change, Complexity and Governance in a Globalizing Space, in DEBATING
GOVERNANCE: AUTHORITY, STEERING, AND DEMOCRACY 167, 167 (Jon Pierre ed., 2000); Maria
Bonnafous-Boucher, From Government to Governance, in STAKEHOLDER THEORY: A EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVE 1 (Maria Bonnafous-Boucher & Yvon Pesqueux eds., 2005).

48

Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (April 13, 2006).

49

TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 45, at 4; Eric C. Ip, Globalization and the Future of the
Law of Sovereign State, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 636, 636–55 (2010); Frank J. Garcia, Globalization’s Law:
Transnational, Global or Both?, in THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE 2015 31–46 (Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo ed., 2016). See generally JEAN-BERNARD
AUBY, GLOBALISATION, LAW AND THE STATE (2017).
See generally James Howley, The Non-State Actor and International Law: A Challenge to State Primacy?, 7
DIALOGUE 1 (2009); NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS (Anne Peters et al. ed., 2009).
See generally Lorenzo Casini, Down the Rabbit-Hole: The Projection of the Public/Private Distinction Beyond
the State, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 402 (2014).
Hari M. Osofsky, The Creation of the International Law of Climate Change: Complexities of Sub-State Actors,
in NON-STATE ACTORS, SOFT LAW AND PROTECTIVE REGIMES: FROM THE MARGINS 179, 190
(Cecilia M. Bailliet ed., 2012); Christoph Schreuer, The Warning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New
Paradigm for International Law, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 447, 450 (1993).
See generally Michele M. Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, Transnational Networks and Global Environmental
Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 471; Diane Stone, Global Public
Policy, Transnational Policy Communities, and Their Networks, 36 POL’Y STUD. J. 19 (2008).

50

51

52

53

54
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See generally Roderic Pitty & Shannara Smith, The Indigenous Challenge to Westphalian Sovereignty, 46
AUSTRALIAN J. POL. SCI. 121 (2011).
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resolution in transnational settings; ongoing demands and uses for regulatory
harmonization;55 mounting interconnectedness of global society, enabling
decisions in one state to impact other states’ internal interests;56 and the generally
observed decline in the role of the nation-state, as traditionally understood, in
resolving cross-border challenges.57

C. Lex Maritima
Transnational law’s appeal lies particularly in the romantic notion of finding
overlapping international “communities” or networks who subject themselves to
a self-crafted legal system built around internal legal rules (self-defined or based
on community custom) and external legal rules (state, supranational, and global
laws), replete with their own dedicated machinery for internal norm resolution or
enforcement (including by negotiation, arbitration, or adjudication).58 The most
famous such global system is the supposed medieval lex mercatoria, or merchant
law. This system has arguably been revived in the modern context with
commercial customs and usages, state and non-state in origin, to which
transnational commercial actors subject themselves today.59 This is largely
supported by the almost unquestioning recognition of the legality of arbitration
awards and the very high level of internal compliance with them,60 as well as new
methods of internal coercion across the business community,61 with strong
reputational, mutual obligation, and internalization mechanisms occasioning

55
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See generally THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HARMONISATION (Mads Andenas & Camilla Baasch
Andersen eds., 2011); Roy Goode, Reflections on the Harmonisation of Commercial Law, 1991 UNIF. L.
REV. 54 (1991).
Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods, 108 AM. J. INT’L
L. 1, 3 (2014); JOHN MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN UNION: A CONCISE
INTRODUCTION 3–4 (3rd ed. 2005). See generally MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK
SOCIETY (2d ed. 2010).
Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50, 50–66 (1997). See generally STATES AGAINST
MARKETS: THE LIMITS OF GLOBALIZATION (Robert Boyer & Daniel Drache eds., 1996); SUSAN
STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
(1996).
See generally TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 45.
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See generally Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13 J. EUR. PUB.
POL. 627 (2006); Klaus Peter Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global Market Place, 3 INT’L ARB.
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compliance.62 Similarly, one can look at how the sovereign state has acquiesced its
role in deciding transnational commercial matters63 and readily recognizes and
enforces applications of non-state law.64 This picture of a transnational legal
system, most idealistically found in the commercial context, has also found
expression in numerous other visions of global legal communities,65 the most
interesting of which for present purposes is the lex maritima, or maritime law.66
The lex maritima envisages that, long before nation-states appropriated the
law of the sea and transcribed it into domestic legislation, much maritime activity
was self-governed by the maritime community themselves.67 The networking of
mariners across continental ports in previous centuries arguably necessitated the
development of mariners’ own systems of rules and customs. These customs and
rules were often enforced internally or via available town councils, merchant
courts, and guild consuls.68 Indeed, it seems well accepted that prior to the
embedding of the Westphalian ideology from the 17th century, many of the
maritime community’s rules had derived from widely shared codes and customary
principles, such as the Lex Rhodia, Rôles d’Oléron, Laws of Wisby, and the Consolata
del Mare.69 For example, one historian noted how maritime law was regarded as a
universal and “common system of law,” given that “[t]here was . . . in those days
nothing strange in laws that were not national.”70 Therefore, the extent to which
these maritime codes actually formed a unified common law, in preference to local
62

Dalhuisen, supra note 26, at 174; Ralf Michaels, The Re-Statement of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of
Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209, 1237 (2005).
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Stone Sweet, supra note 59, at 638; Michaels & Jansen, supra note 34, at 872; THOMAS E.
CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 293
(2005).
Gesa Baron, Do the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts Form a New Lex
Mercatoria?, 15 ARB. INT’L 115, 126 (1999); MARTIN M. SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW,
POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 312 (2002). See generally David W. Rivkin, Enforceability of Arbitral
Awards Based on Lex Mercatoria, 9 ARB. INT’L 67 (1993).
Such as the lex sportiva (sports law), lex informatica (information law or cyber law), lex constructionis
(construction law), lex financiaria or argentaria (finance law), and lex petrolea (oil law).
See generally William Tetley, The General Maritime Law - The Lex Maritima, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. &
COM. 105 (1994); ANDREAS MAURER, LEX MARITIMA: GRUNDZÜGE EINES TRANSNATIONALEN
SEEHANDELSRECHTS (2012).
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Albrecht Cordes, Lex Maritima? Local, Regional, and Universal Maritime Law in the Middle Ages, in THE
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MARITIME TRADE AROUND EUROPE 1300–1600, 69–85 (Wim
Blockmans et al. eds., 2017).
William Senior, The History of Maritime Law, 38 THE MARINER’S MIRROR 260 (1952). See generally
Trakman, supra note 59; Tetley, supra note 66.
ROBERT M. HUGHES, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW 5–6 (1901). See generally Edda Frankot,
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custom and decentered regulation, has for some time been a question of academic
interest.
More recent and detailed historiographical scholarship on the matter,
however, has put considerable doubt on whether such a common maritime law ever
existed.71 Indeed, many have correctly pointed out that the dearth of social bonds
and interdependencies between regional actors in the pre-globalization age makes
it inevitable that divergent customs and interests would have undermined any
efforts at establishing unified laws across continents.72 A great deal of research
has, therefore, attempted to disprove the transnational account by disproving the
historical account.73 Yet, whether a common maritime law existed in the medieval
period does not detract from the essential hypothesis that unified systems carry
normative advantages in denationalized contexts. As Ralf Michaels has aptly
summarized, “whether there ever was a true lex mercatoria . . . [is] relatively
secondary.”74
Along this more precise line of inquiry, the commentary is far more
unanimous. For example, a system of maritime community-led law should carry
additional advantages of efficiency through the utilization of stakeholder
resources, lower transaction costs, and strong compliance incentivization.75 By
penalization, suspension, or ostracism of community members, it would also be
possible to effectively punish rule-breakers and to improve trade access by
utilizing reputational mechanisms, trust-building, and clearing houses.76
Furthermore, there is an argument that such communities of mariners would hold
greater esteem toward legal rules that were crafted and enforced by and among

71
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Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153 (2012); Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace:
The Modern Distortion of the Medieval Law Merchant, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685 (2006).
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ARB. INT’L 86 (2014).
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Resolution and Enforcement without the State, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 269, 270–80 (2005); Filip De Ly, Lex
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75

76

Winter 2021

431

Chicago Journal of International Law

themselves.77 In other words, by eschewing the strict role of the nation-state, a
transnational legal system has a greater capacity to handle the complex, reflexive,
and multi-level interactions in the globalized or transnational context.

III. W EAKNESSES OF THE I NTERNATIONAL L AW OF THE S EA
It is becoming increasingly clear that there is something wrong with the system
of the international law of the sea, rather than merely the content of the laws
themselves.78 However, while law of the sea scholars have made ad hoc or casual
references to issues such as zonality, territorial sovereignty, and state compliance,
commentary has rarely pointed at the Westphalian system of international law as
the root cause of failed ocean management.79 This section suggests that three
integral and interlinked manifestations of the Westphalian system—sovereign
exclusivity, sovereign equality, and territorial sovereignty—represent the fundamental
weaknesses in our international law of the sea.

A. Sovereign Exclusivity
Sovereign exclusivity refers to the unrestricted authority of states to assume
absolute rule over their own subjects. It regards nation-states as entirely unitary
systems, where everything that relates to regulatory governance of a nation’s
citizens is under the self-determination of a discrete and centralized authority.80 In
the maritime context, as elsewhere, this exclusive sovereignty manifests itself by
nation-states freely deciding whether to enter into international treaties.81
Negotiations, therefore, habitually lead to diluted, ambiguous, and hortatory
commitments between states.82 What is more, assuming that a recalcitrant state
even agrees to enter into a resulting treaty, it still possesses discretion as to the
77

78
79
80

81

82

See KIRK EMERSON & TINA NABATCHI, COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE REGIMES 64–68 (2015). See
generally Benjamin Cashore, Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State
Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority, 15 GOVERNANCE: INT’L J.
POL’Y, ADMIN. & INSTS. 503 (2002).
See Section V.
See Section III.A.
See, e.g., PERRY ANDERSON, LINEAGES OF THE ABSOLUTIST STATE (1974); Arthur L. Goodhart, Rule
of Law and Absolute Sovereignty, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 943 (1958); John Charvet, The Idea of State Sovereignty
and the Right of Humanitarian Intervention, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 39 (1997).
A well-known example is the continued refusal of the U.S. to ratify the U.N. 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea. Mark A. Pollack, Who Supports International Law, and Why: The United States, the
European Union, and the International Legal Order, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 873, 878–79 (2015).
See MARGARET P. KARNS, KAREN A. MINGST & KENDALL W. STILES, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: THE POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 27 (3d ed. 2015);
George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News about Compliance Good
News about Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 392–95 (1996); SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND
STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 11 (2003).
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interpretation and implementation of the treaty against its own citizens in the
domestic realm.83 Further, for most global public goods—such as the protection
of the ocean environment—states often have more to gain individually and less
to lose by weak compliance.84
Although rarely linked, these manifestations of sovereign exclusivity are
important criticisms of the present model of ocean management. First, the
majority of international ocean management treaties suffer from the trade-off
between invoking strong commitments and the need for widespread ratification.85
A good example is the United Nations 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea
(LOSC).86 Although a remarkable achievement in terms of comprehensive and
consensus-based treaty making, the LOSC did not receive support and ratification
from most key maritime powers until an implementation agreement in 1994—in
effect, a rewrite of Part XI—neutered the original vision of fairly sharing the
resources of the deep seabed.87 Formal treaties, therefore, also end up with weak
and precatory language, such as requiring states to “cooperate”88 or that they
“should” follow a course of action.89 Often, the only way to get states to enter into
international commitments is by adopting hollow language or developing

83
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See JEAN L. COHEN, GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY: RETHINKING LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY,
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(James Cameron et al. eds., 1995).
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international “soft law.”90 Naturally, however, such rules have numerous
difficulties, including weaknesses in enforceability and the lack of vigor in
compliance.91 Even through a constructivist lens—that sees the gradual hardening
of norms by facilitated learning and coordination92—compliance can be
damagingly poor for extended time periods. This is often the case until a media
fallout from a catastrophic event that at last foments regulatory motivation and
action, which is all too frequently after the event.93
Second, states can hold treaty negotiations for ransom, driving forward the
hegemonic and politicized nature of ocean law. It is no coincidence that the most
powerful maritime nations tend to espouse legal rules that are most closely aligned
with international custom.94 Such multilaterally defined laws usually favor those
nations found higher in the pecking order of global power. The excessive reliance
upon flag state enforcement has suited the most powerful flag states95—just as a
“first-come, first-served” system of managing resources in the high seas has suited
the most industrialized nations.96 A driving factor in the sudden expansion of state
claims in the aftermath of World War II is perhaps that the U.S., U.K., Russia,
France, Japan, Canada, and Australia are each in the worldwide top ten of

90
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exclusive economic zone (EEZ) size.97 The subsequent conclusion of an
international convention that permits these states to exclusively extract the wealth
of resources hundreds of miles offshore, but with little meaningful legal
responsibility to steward the protection of their EEZ’s natural environment, is
perhaps unsurprising. As Gregory Shaffer says in another context, international
law has “failed to constrain power when power chose to belittle and ignore it, and
it served to legitimize power when power deigned to deploy it.”98 Seen in this light,
the burgeoning naval strength of China in the Southwest Pacific and its growing
friction with both the LOSC and the rule of law is as unsurprising as it is
predictable.99
An essential result of this politicization of the law of the sea and of the
freedom of states to reject or dilute international agreements is the inability to
compel or coerce states into assuming additional obligations or burdens.100 With
its flawed reliance upon states primarily agreeing to be bound by consent,
international law allows for commitments between states, which maximizes the
opportunity to externalize losses and minimize economic risks from ocean-based
activities.101 The most visible example is the continual reinvocation of the system
of flag state enforcement. This system for regulating ocean stakeholders—relying
on the exclusive enforcement of a flag state’s national legal rules within its
domestic courts—is widely felt to be a poor system of ocean supervision and
accountability.102 The deficient enforcement of the “genuine link” requirement—
97
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64 (1994). See generally Feng Zhang, Assessing China’s Response to the South China Sea Arbitration Ruling,
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requiring that there be a “genuine link” between vessels and the states where they
are registered, which is discussed further below—and the fact that most flag states
are distant from and indifferent to the true activities of vessels bearing their flag
has led many to argue that sole reliance upon flag state enforcement is a formula
for failure.103 Indeed, many “flags-of-convenience” specialize in maximizing the
internalization of financial gains and the externalization of environmental or
health and safety harms.104
Another manifestation of sovereign exclusivity is the complete freedom of
states to interpret, implement, and enforce resulting treaties. Such commitments
between states are not only weak in compliance pull, but create international
agreements that are deliberately vague and ambiguous.105 Examples abound in the
maritime context, including phrases such as “maximum sustainable yield” in both
Article 119 of the LOSC106 and Article 5 of the 1995 U.N. Fish Stocks
Agreement,107 and also “purposes of scientific research” in the 1946 International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.108 Such equivocal phrases are
intentionally included to provide sufficient latitude in self-interpretation and selfdiscipline, so as to incentivize objecting or free-riding states to join the treaty
regimes.109 While this practice is often coined “constructive ambiguity,” an
alternative term could be “destructive ambiguity,” given how states often flout
such well-intentioned phrases and interpret them in a self-interested manner that
is destructive to the wider community.110
103
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States to Implement and Enforce International Standards and Regulations—And Measures to Counter Their
Failure to Do So, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 297 (2011).

104
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This unrestricted freedom of states to interpret, implement, and enforce the
laws governing their citizens is at the heart of the struggling system of ocean
stewardship. Its weakness is perhaps most vividly manifested in the unconditional
freedom of states to self-interpret and enforce the genuine link requirement for
registering vessels under Article 91 of the LOSC.111 As flag states assume the
central responsibility for managing offshore operations, it is vital that those
operations possess a meaningful relationship with the supervising flag state and,
more so, that they are residents of or hold identifiable assets in that country against
which sanctions can be enforced. Unfortunately, open registry states—states
providing flags-of-convenience—are almost entirely free to self-interpret the
genuine link requirement according to their own standards.112 Ironically,
international efforts to close this critical loophole through the U.N. 1986
Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships113 failed because the intended
addressees—by ultimately using this very same freedom to act autonomously—
were free to reject the treaty.114 In 1999, the International Tribunal on the Law of
the Sea revisited this loophole in the M/V “Saiga” case.115 Unfortunately, the
Tribunal held that the strength of a genuine link between vessel and flag state is
not a matter that can be contested by others (outside the flag state itself) nor a
question of the quality of state regulatory oversight, but rather is purely an
administrative question of whether the flag state has been formally appointed as
the registered flag state.116
This failure of unencumbered internal sovereignty goes much further. For
example, it enables offshore tax havens, money laundering, asset moving, forumshopping, and the creation of impenetrably complex, multi-front company
111

See generally Gotthard Mark Gauci & Kevin Aquilina, The Legal Fiction of a Genuine Link As a
Requirement for the Grant of Nationality to Ships and Humans—the Triumph of Formality over Substance?, 17
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 167 (2017); Simon W. Tache, The Nationality of Ships: The Definitional
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See H.W. Wefers Bettink, Open Registry, the Genuine Link and the 1986 Convention on Registration
Conditions for Ships, 18 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 69, 86 (1987); DANIEL PATRICK O’CONNELL, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: VOLUME II 760 (Ivan Anthony Shearer ed., 1984); Moira L.
McConnell, “. . . Darkening Confusion Mounted upon Darkening Confusion”: The Search for the Elusive
Genuine Link, 16 J. MAR. L. & COM. 365, 376 (1985).
Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, Feb. 7, 1986, U.N. Doc. TD/RS/CONF/23,
https://perma.cc/2FXX-JAYZ.
See generally Francisco J. Montero Llácer, Open Registers: Past, Present and Future, 27 MARINE POL’Y 513
(2003). On the need for the Convention, see Le T. Thuong, From Flags of Convenience to Captive Ship
Registries, 27 TRANSP. J. 22 (1987); George C. Kasoulides, The 1986 United Nations Convention on the
Conditions for Registration of Vessels and the Question of Open Registry, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 543
(1989).
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M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Judgment of Jul. 1, 1999,
https://perma.cc/UDA5-8G3L.
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Id. ¶ 83; see also M/V Virginia G (Panama v. Guinea-Bissau), Case No. 19, Judgment of Apr. 14,
2014, ¶¶ 112–113, https://perma.cc/27GF-XWDY.
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structures across multiple jurisdictions.117 Thus, the freedom of states to craft their
own regulations fails in a system that allows ocean stakeholders—legal or natural
persons of a truly transnational quality—to freely select a jurisdiction to hide
assets, register front companies, hear foreign claims, align their environmental
standards, access markets, and pay taxes.118
What is more, each national legal system is free to interpret and implement
their commitments across all sectors in an endless variety of ways. One method is
to create a complex “horrendogram” of multiple overlapping and conflicting
policies that make it even more challenging to identify clear norms and ensure
their observance.119 This intensive fragmentation of law creates not only a great
uncertainty of ocean law, but also gives wide berth for different interpretations.
The further result of this lack of certainty is that state obligations are rarely
opaque, leaving room for despondency when it comes to implementation.120
Given that international commitments are arranged horizontally between
political sovereigns, their subsequent implementation relies on a complex, costly,
and arguably cumbersome system of interstate bilateral and diplomatic
enforcement. In other words, an “injured” state needs to invest valued political
resources—including civil service time, finance, and goodwill—to direct
enforcement against an evidently “culpable” state.121 All transnational ocean users

117

118

119

120

121

See Jade Lindley & Erika, J. Techera, Overcoming Complexity in Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing
to Achieve Effective Regulatory Pluralism, 81 MARINE POL’Y 71, 71–79 (2017). See generally
LANGEWIESCHE, supra note 1; ROSE GEORGE, DEEP SEA AND FOREIGN GOING: INSIDE SHIPPING,
THE INVISIBLE INDUSTRY THAT BRINGS YOU 90% OF EVERYTHING (2013); Anastasia Telesetsky,
Laundering Fish in the Global Undercurrents: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Transnational
Organized Crime, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 939 (2014).
See generally Victor Galaz et al., Tax Havens and Global Environmental Degradation, 2 NATURE ECOLOGY
& EVOLUTION 1352 (2018); Jane Marc Wells, Comment, Vessel Registration in Selected Open Registries,
6 MAR. L. 221 (1981); FINK LEON, SWEATSHOPS AT SEA: MERCHANT SEAMEN IN THE WORLD’S
FIRST GLOBALIZED INDUSTRY, FROM 1812 TO THE PRESENT (2011).
See generally Suzanne J. Boyes & Michael Elliott, Marine Legislation—The Ultimate ‘Horrendogram’:
International Law, European Directives & National Implementation, 86 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 39
(2014).
See generally Emeka Duruigbo, Multinational Corporations and Compliance with International Regulations
Relating to the Petroleum Industry, 7 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 101 (2001); Olav F. Knudsen &
Björn Hassler, IMO Legislation and its Implementation: Accident Risk, Vessel Deficiencies and National
Administrative Practices, 35 MARINE POL’Y 201 (2011); Marianna Cavallo et al., Benefits and Impediments
for the Integrated and Coordinated Management of European Seas, 86 MARINE POL’Y 206 (2017).
See Jan Klabbers, Compliance Procedures, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 995, 1002 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey eds., 2008);
Harrison, supra note 4, at 41; Christine Chinkin & Romana Sadurska, The Anatomy of International
Dispute Resolution, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 39, 54–55, 78–79 (1991). See generally Andrew T.
Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 303 (2002); Christina Voigt, State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages, 77 NORDIC
J. INT’L L. 1 (2008).
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must therefore petition their own nation-state to take on their litigative mantle,
creating a constrained and indirect route between two “foreign” stakeholders.122
Nollkaemper refers to an uncited case which perfectly illustrates this
quandary.123 Here, fishermen in the North Sea brought a claim against the German
government alleging that a permit authorizing a factory to dump acid in the North
Sea—which killed and deformed many of the fish stocks they relied on—was in
breach of the London Convention124 and the Convention for the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, ratified by Germany. 125
Despite clear evidence of contravention of these agreements, however, the
Federal Administrative Court of Hamburg rejected the claim on the basis that
these international agreements were between states and did not create private rights
for the ocean users themselves.126
The horizontal nature of sovereign equal-state relations also effectively
minimizes available sanctions and further neutralizes the effectiveness of the
adjudicatory process. This emphasis on state interests and state responsibility
provides states with the freedom to discount the external interests of the
international community or the internal interests of one’s national community. It
also leads to a problematic mismatch in the allocation of governance authority
and, often, to self-centered decision making in areas with transnational impacts.127
Certainly, there are movements in the right direction toward new,128 cosmopolitan,129

122
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1972, 932 UNTS 3 (entered into force Apr. 7, 1974).
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GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: KEY DEBATES 20, 21–25 (Barry Holden ed., 2000). See generally John S.
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interdependent,130 relational,131 responsible132 post-Westphalian,133 and contingent or
conditional forms of sovereignty.134 But these developments are a slowly emerging
byproduct of globalization and gradual universal integration.135 They do not,
therefore, excuse traditional norms of nonintervention and firm sovereign
boundaries as culprits for our presently failing global environmental stewardship.
What is more, at their core, these alternative forms of sovereignty are merely
idealized or aspirational concepts of international relations, rather than depictions
of the true allocation of legal authority that we rely on today. This is particularly
the case with international agreements to divide up the ocean’s wealth. Thus, they
only reflect the slow and tired process of states reacting to political crises that
routinely occur after the event, once disasters finally attract sufficient media
coverage to generate political currency. The Westphalian expectation of exclusivity
of national jurisdiction, along with its intense distrust of systems of shared
responsibility, therefore, forces the hand of the law of the sea and its arbiters
toward maintaining the status quo.136
Critically, this stringent doctrine of sovereign exclusivity promotes the
widespread norm of noninterference.137 Robert Jackson even described
nonintervention as a grundnorm of Westphalian sovereignty138 and, certainly, the

130
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131
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Order, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 23 (2004).
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customary norm that flagrant rule-breakers can only be interdicted under narrow
circumstances is a feature that provides our oceans with an aura of lawlessness.139
In the EEZ, the number of circumstances under which a coastal state can
intercept or regulate nonstate vessels is somewhat greater than that of the High
Seas, but it is still limited to specific and discrete conflicts that center on the coastal
state’s economic interests.140 Consequently, many wider security issues are left out,
such as military operations, organized crime, and environmental crime. Regulation
is further restricted to prescriptive rules set at the international table, such as those
negotiated by the International Maritime Organization.141
This guarding of flagged vessels roaming the oceans from any interference
is not the underlying notion of the mare liberum, as is frequently misunderstood.142
Rather, it is a wholly Westphalian idea that national governments exclusively
govern their respective citizens with no other nation or institution permitted to
intervene or share supervision.143 This system results in flag states undertaking
regulatory “supervision” from jurisdictions with no practical connection to
activities and located thousands of miles away.144 It also permits flag states wide
latitude in the design and enforcement of the standards against which their fleet
are monitored, thereby bringing a vital source of income to that state.145 As a
result, there are countless reports of underenforcement and poor supervision by
flag states.146 These systems of flag state supervision are so defective that

139
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Winter 2021

441

Chicago Journal of International Law

oceangoing vessels have been referred to as “neglectful,”147 “outlaws,”148
“lawless,”149 “mobile pockets of sovereignty,”150 “sovereign islands,”151
“delinquent,”152 and “a law unto themselves.”153 Moreover, given strong links
between organized crime and poor flag state supervision, rogue vessels are
frequently synonymized with piracy.154

B. Sovereign Equality
Like sovereign exclusivity, sovereign equality holds that all states are selfgoverning and unitary. It is principally concerned, however, with the horizontal
nature of state relations.155 As an important principle for preventing a world
ordered by military or economic power, the equal treatment of states accords
identical legal rights and responsibilities to each state.156 In reality, however, the
strict interpretation of sovereign equality and the routine treatment of all states as
equals further propagate the consent-based order of international law. This is
because such an order removes the opportunity to create any over-arching
authority and, with it, any capacity to compel or coerce noncompliant states into
147
148
149

150
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producing global public goods.157 Indeed, such a principle could secure for states
the equality of responsibility, opportunity, and rights to self-governance despite
actual asymmetries in these areas.158 Ironically, sovereign equality therefore arguably
derails distributive justice and sustains illiberal democracies by permitting all
nations to enjoy equal authority, even if their internal systems are corrupt or
harmful to social and environmental interests.159
Horizontalism—while intended to minimize anarchy and hegemony—still
results in ineffective enforcement powers, thus ensuring that international law
centers around the same power politics and is habitually undermined by its realist
limitations.160 Recent and notorious examples of this freedom of the system’s
intended subjects to reject unfavorable interpretations of the law include: Japan’s
continued refusal to follow the rulings of the International Whaling
Commission,161 the Russian Federation’s refusal to recognize the compulsory
jurisdiction and ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Arctic Sunrise
case in 2015,162 and China’s refusal to recognize the arbitration panel’s compulsory
jurisdiction and ruling 2016, which rejected China’s amassing territorial claims in
the South China Sea.163

157

158

159

160

161

162
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Horizontalism’s equality requirement also opens space for conflict over the
potential hierarchization of international norms,164 thus potentially bulwarking
defenses against anything beyond a narrow interpretation of peremptory or erga
omnes norms intended to provide for universal responsibility. In its external
manifestation, as with exclusivity, this equality requirement also gives states the
power to ritually contest the jurisdiction, or worse—the legitimacy of external
institutional processes.165 As a result, states also habitually prefer to avoid
politically transparent and expensive adjudicatory processes and, instead, resolve
matters through drawn out and obstacle-ridden diplomatic channels.166 This not
only breeds uncertainty and indecision, but also reduces the opportunities to
clarify or develop international legal jurisprudence.167 This lack of adjudication is
then compounded by the narrow focus of states upon economic or political
interests when justifying the pursuit of international claims, which further limits
the opportunity for hearing and advancing the rules of responsibility for
producing global goods, such as those protecting the international environment.168
A horizontal system of inter-national relations also promotes a system of
constant competition between states. One state’s inalienable right to undertake a
course of action free from interference permits that state to freely produce
externalities, which can only be absorbed by another state. Given the harmful
interoperation of free riding and the prisoner’s dilemma in addressing collective
action challenges, states operating as equal bargaining agents usually treat
international relations as a zero or negative-sum game. At the same time, selfish
decision making can still be rewarded, and altruism—causing short-term
socioeconomic loss to one’s own citizens—risks punishment.169 A system of international relations in which states can, consciously or unconsciously, externalize
losses and maximize gains provides the perfect environment for regulatory “races
164
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168
169
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66 (2013).
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to the bottom,” where states are forced to compete for limited available
resources.170 It also locks states into zero-sum games where they fear that a strategy
of abatement, such as from the presently unsustainable subsidization of industrialscale fishing, will lead to considerable economic losses for them in exchange for
gains to free riders.171 In other words, the Westphalian system is built entirely
around a false belief of independence, while the shared use of a globalized and
transnational ocean can only ever be interdependent.
The drive to attract ship registrations, processing fees, company
registrations, and legal fees incentivizes competition among states to offer more
effective flags or ports of convenience.172 The more that a state can externalize
losses—such as ensuring that environmental degradation takes place overseas or
that foreign citizens are unable to pursue economic claims against its nationals—
the more it can profit.173 States locked in this competition for maritime business
are treated as equals, regardless of whether they actually possess the necessary
resources, expertise, or regulatory infrastructure to properly supervise their
flagged vessels or enforce legislation. In fact, in the majority of cases, they do
not.174
Underenforcement and turning a blind eye, therefore, become the norm for
popular ports and flag state regulators.175 As research has consistently shown,
states locked in such negatively-reinforcing spirals will find it immensely difficult
to break out of such patterns of behavior within a consent-based legal system.176
Only by hundreds of ongoing interactions can actors engage in “repeat games,”
thus building up the trust and goodwill that enables them to agree to more
meaningful rules or better systems of enforcement. Nevertheless, when each state
170
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has the equal and unrestricted freedom to externalize losses—particularly by
avoiding “unequal” regulatory oversight from a higher order or a collective of
foreign states—the temptation to free ride or withdraw from efforts at regulatory
integration can continue to undermine collaborative efforts. This is particularly
true where states lack true political or economic incentives to constrain their own
sovereign freedoms.177
These harmful effects of horizontalism are pervasive—even between
politically friendly nations. For example, regional fisheries management
organizations were specifically designed to remove comparative trade-offs
between states in a regional context and to ensure coordination and the collective
raising of regional standards. Yet, even here, there is strong international
competition and pathologies of free riding.178 Indeed, Donald Rothwell reports
how—even between regional neighbors—the achievement of effective
cooperation patterns is still entirely contingent on:
[the] overall political relationship between the States concerned, cultural and
socio-economic divergences, the presence or absence of pervasive territorial
or maritime disputes, the significance accorded to and prioritizing of oceans
management by individual States, the effective implementation of regional
instruments by individual States, the nature and extent of sea-based activities
and financial resources and capacity.179

Indeed, the rejection by U.K. voters of regionally integrated collective gains in the
2016 Brexit referendum demonstrates just how vividly much of society still
perceives their entitlement to self-government and self-advancement under the
veil of national sovereignty, even after evidence of sustained collective gains
between politically friendly nations.180

C. Sovereign Territoriality
Territorial sovereignty—the idea of segregated “zones” upon ocean space—
is another symptom of Westphalianism, which has already been recognized as a
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key regulatory weakness in ocean governance.181 It is also possible, as with the
other two characteristics of sovereignty, to see territoriality as overlapping and
interlinked with the other traits. For example, through sovereign equality, all states
demand reciprocal rights to any claimed resources in the ocean, which ultimately
leads to a global allocation of resource zones. Similarly, through sovereign
exclusivity, there is a necessary presumption that one state must be positioned to
assume regulatory jurisdiction over each subject matter, with the result that all
states have carved up the entirety of the ocean in pursuit of a fair allocation of
juridical responsibility for every factual circumstance. While this zonal approach
has grown predominantly by creeping unilateral claims to offshore resources, it
has also been viewed as a strategic opportunity to propertize all ocean space, with
the hope that coastal states will internalize environmental degradation and so
guard “their” environmental assets in offshore regions.182 This strategy, however,
ultimately failed given that states could now focus on exploiting their newly
acquired resources in these distant offshore spaces, while conveniently treating
the protection of the environment “out there” as an externality.183
The global patchwork of maritime zones, which results from this inter-state
territoriality, has created hundreds of diverse regulatory systems that are cut-off
and distinct from neighboring zones.184 Further, it results in interactions between
transnational actors that—moving casually and fluidly across the entire ocean
space—must necessarily take place through tired inter-national lines,185 which also
leads to forum-shopping between enforcement agencies and regulatory systems.186
Ocean ecosystems, humans included, therefore witness constant regulatory gaps
and overlaps, despite taking little practical notice of artificially-constructed
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political borders.187 Perhaps the biggest driving force behind the development of
transnational law in other fields has been the desire to avoid the cost, complexity,
unpredictability, apprehension, and inefficiency associated with private
international law.188 Unless a cross-border claim is particularly strong and carries
a significant payoff, it is rarely worth the risk and cost of pursuing. 189 This failure
of law between borders is further compounded by: (1) the near-phantom legal
nature of many maritime actors, who operate within multi-front and multinational companies;190 (2) the lack of transparency of national actors and agencies,
whose efforts to produce global goods can be safely shrouded in hortatory
language; and (3) the use of a complex system of multifarious national legal
systems, which are randomly allocated by technocratic and idiosyncratic conflict
of law rules.
Furthermore, given the absolute freedom of states to self-regulate and reject
foreign interference, the use of civil liability regimes—aiming to facilitate crossborder enforcement by harmonization and reciprocation—also fail on account of
their ritual rejection or wholesale dilution.191 Ocean stakeholders can, therefore,
avoid the force of private liability between overseas actors. Moreover, as
highlighted earlier, transnational stakeholders must also rely on foreign states to
implement effective public and private legislation and have no path to appeal to
foreign governments for deficient regulation and enforcement.192 The result could
be a sense of detachment and disassociation of regulatory actors from the
regulatory systems under which they find themselves, and the disassociation of
those regulatory systems from the actors.
These permitted cutoffs between regulatory systems in the ocean
environment propagates a “Not-In-My-Backyard” attitude in which regulators
naturally focus on investing in protection over internal or local interests and are
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tempted to disregard external matters.193 Perhaps most fundamentally, the artificial
fragmentation of ocean space into pockets of national interest prevents an
efficient integration of capacities. As such, the considerable security resources,
data, equipment, skills, and rules needed to achieve effective ocean management
and protection are habitually and inefficiently duplicated side-by-side—rather
than harmonized together in effective and coordinated regional systems between
all actors and agencies.194 Thus, even if states work together to achieve collective
action, the underlying belief system built around exclusive sovereign “rights” and
“ownership” in each maritime zone continues to undermine any sense of joint and
several responsibility. This is at the heart of demands for a more integrated,
regionally-coordinated, and ecosystems-oriented model of ocean governance.

D. Westphalian Ocean Management: A System of Recurrent
“Gaps”
Many of the findings surrounding the ocean’s reliance upon Westphalian
intergovernmentalism, therefore, highlight an endemic recurrence of “gaps.” First,
we witness recurrent knowledge gaps. This relates to the lack of communication
between stakeholders and regulators, meaning that local or private actors’
knowledge or interests have not been effectively incorporated into regulatory
decision making.195 It also refers to the lack of informed decision making by
market actors,196 the lack of data exchange, resource pooling, and surveillance
cooperation between regulators and enforcement agencies,197 the lack of accurate
scientific data,198 and the need for marine stakeholders to effectively cooperate
193
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and communicate regarding each other’s relative activities, resources, and
interests.199
Second, the geographical gaps inherent in ocean governance are widely known,
and—as discussed in the context of sovereign territoriality—the fragmented
nature of ocean management is a familiar opprobrium. Not only do these gaps
relate to the weakness and inefficiency of completely segregated regulation,200 but
also to the fluid movement of persons, species, and other objects between political
borders;201 the lack of regulatory regimes in many regions around the world;202 and
the failure of multilevel coordination and cooperation between regulatory
systems.203
Third, closely interrelated, but less obvious, are the prevalent regulatory,
incentive, normative, and compliance gaps in transnational ocean management.
Regulatory gaps occur where legislation or regulatory processes are lagging or suffer
from poor coordination. For example, there is a particular concern with divided
schemes of regulation where disconnected organizations and actors operate within
regulatory siloes.204 Critics also regularly point to the lack of coordination and
regulatory cooperation between international organizations, regulators, national
legislatures, and enforcement agencies.205 What is more, we witness a languid pace
of regulation, especially when it is negotiated through political inter-state
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bargaining processes that fail to keep pace with constantly shifting and intensifying
human activities in the ocean or with new threats and opportunities.206
Fourth, and related, normative gaps describe deficiencies in accountability and
the widespread lack of mandatory compliance-inducing obligations, with a
recurring reliance upon ambiguous language or hortatory commitments, including
within unenforceable rules or industry self-regulation.207
Fifth, compliance gaps refer to the issue of compliance by states with their
international commitments and with the poor level of implementation and
enforcement by national regulators when dealing with externally valued public
goods.208 It also refers to the lack of compliance by stakeholders with national law,
as they freely select between, or distance themselves from, traditional regulatory
structures.209
Sixth, closely related to normative and compliance gaps are the incentive gaps,
which acknowledge the gap between a desired regulatory object and the incentive
on the part of political actors to comply. Only by enabling consensus-made law
to actually reign over consent-based self-enforcement, along with the eradication
of horizontalism by the building of more powerful enforcement mechanisms, can
regulators be incentivized to invest in much-needed cooperation and to break
down the harmful interoperation of the prisoner’s dilemma and free riding, as
discussed above.210
The consent-based, horizontal, and zonal system of public international law
has thus weakened the effectiveness of ocean management for so long that an
entirely new approach to ocean law and governance is needed. In order to bridge
all these “gaps,” such a new approach—which is discussed in Section V—must
operate as a truly multi-stakeholder system which is arranged with true power
reallocated across the global, regional, local, and transnational scales. In other
words, we need a true and real attainment of a transnational law of the sea.
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Despite all the evidence that Westphalianism is centrally to blame for our
struggling law of the sea, this has been hardly noticed or noted in existing academic
discussions. In 2006, Richard Barnes, David Freestone, and David Ong did tell us
that:
the underlying emphasis of prescriptive and enforcement authority [of the
law of the sea] is in the hands of individual States. This reflects the more
fundamental nature of international law as a horizontal legal system in which
States are sovereign equals under no higher authority than that of
international law.211

In 2010, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tanja Aalberts also observed that the
present-day conception of the ocean as a liberal free-for-all creates a space in
which “participating states may successfully barter off and deconstruct
responsibilities by reference to traditional norms of sovereignty and international
law. Thus . . . the Mare Liberum [sic] becomes the venue for a range of
competing . . . disclaims to sovereignty.”212 Similarly, Barnes only briefly noted in
2015 that while the flag state system, to him at least, has not failed, it “is far from
effective”213 and was “facilitated by the emergence of the modern political State
after the peace of Westphalia.”214
In 1992, Philip Allott provided a welcomed and perceptive criticism of both
the Mare Liberum and Mare Clausum doctrines. He proposed the need for a new
socially inclusive system: the Mare Nostrum, or “Our Sea.”215 Importantly for Allott,
the law of the sea had become a system which:
while still seeming to the uninitiated to be a process for the collective
formation of social objectives, turned itself in practice into a system
that gives effect neither to universal social objectives of all humanity
nor to the social objectives of all human individuals collectivized
through the state systems. It came to be dominated by an independent
dialectic at the median level between the two, the level of relations
between so-called states. Humanity had formed itself into a society
whose social process was interstate relations.216
Nevertheless, there appears to be a discernible lack of focus specifically on public
international law’s failures in the ocean’s transnational ecosystem. Instead, the vast
majority of literature and research in marine governance focuses on Grotius’s
doctrine of the “freedom of the seas” and the problems with relying upon flag
states to regulate global concerns.
211
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IV. T HE S CAPEGOATS OF O UR F AILING O CE AN L AW
A. Mare Liberum: Res Communis or Res Nullius ?
After four centuries of compressing Grotius’s 1609 Mare Liberum into a
dogma that propagates the interests of powerful flag states, this utopian vision for
ocean governance has become frequently misinterpreted. Grotius’s now-famous
monograph was originally written as a legal brief supporting the Dutch East India
Company’s capture and sale of the Portuguese vessel, Santa Catarina, in the
Malacca Strait.217 Its adept integration of wider literature from Ancient Rome and
Greece, and from the views of natural and canonical law, along with Grotius’s
posthumous fame as an international legal theorist, have caused it to have
considerable influence—in name, at least—on our view of ocean law in the
centuries that followed.218 Most commentators on the law of the sea today still
hold considerable disdain for the supposed concept it introduced: the so-called
and now infamous “Freedom of the Seas.”219 This concept allegedly sought to
view the ocean’s resources as res nullius and open to appropriation and
exploitation.220 Unfortunately, however, Grotius stands falsely accused. His
original “Free Sea” did not promote the systemic free-for-all that we can still
detect in global marine lore today but, as will be shown, was actually much more
progressive.
Primarily, this loss in translation has been caused by the convenient
simplification of ocean management into a binary system of competing
strategies—that between the Mare Liberum and the Mare Clausum. On the one hand,
there is the argument for increased territorialization, which would enable coastal
states to more successfully control and effectively regulate large swaths of the
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ocean.221 This argument is said to have arisen from John Selden’s equally famous
rejoinder to Grotius in 1635, titled Mare Clausum, or “Closed Sea.”222 On the other
hand, there is the argument that the ocean should not be territorially appropriated
by anybody but should be open for free and unrestricted access by all—
supposedly exemplified by the Mare Liberum.
These two doctrines have been contorted over the years to try and represent
two binary Westphalian approaches to solving ocean governance. The Mare
Clausum represents the view that coastal and port states should have more power,
given that flag states are often too disconnected from distant ocean activities.
Meanwhile, the Mare Liberum has been inappropriately reinterpreted by the most
powerful flag states of the day—such as the Netherlands, France, the U.K., and
the U.S.—to support the view that the ocean should be “free” from regulation as
far as possible and that, instead, states should primarily regulate their own fleets
through flag state law.223 In reality, as argued in Section IV.B, both are systems
prone to failure because both entail states acting in exclusive national interest and,
hence, externalization of losses to the international community.
Much of the misplaced blame upon the Mare Liberum seems to arise from
the word “freedom.” Grotius did indeed argue that the ocean’s vastness, fluidity,
and unsuitability to physical dominion should render it free from
territorialization.224 Crucially, however, he never posited that the ocean and its
resources should be “free” property to be appropriated or exploited. Rather, quite
oppositely, he argued that the ocean’s resources cannot be appropriated without
prior permission from the international community to which they belong.225 In
other words, he saw its resources as res communis—rather than res nullius—which
was to be shared among all humankind with “a common right [of usage] over
which no other right could be asserted.”226 It was, therefore, a rejection of our
contemporary understanding of private dominion over ocean property, in that
221
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224
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such ownership means the ocean is “incapable of belonging to someone else as
well.”227 This common ownership model was premised on the fact that “there [is]
nothing to prevent a number of persons from being joint owners . . . of one and
the same thing.”228 He argued, thus, that the ocean was a gift from God and “not
to this or that individual, but to the human race,”229 and “that all that which has
been so constituted by nature that although serving some one person it still
suffices for the common use of all other persons, is today and ought in perpetuity
to remain in the same condition as when it was first created by nature.”230 As a
result, only those activities which can be done “without loss to anyone else” are
tacitly permitted by the global community.231
On this basis, Grotius was able to argue that certain “freedoms” should be
automatically available because they are not prima facie causing loss to humankind.
For example, his primary argument was actually that maritime navigation can only
be free and unrestricted because—at his time at least—ships leave “no more than
a ‘track in the sea,’”232 and the ocean “is not exhausted by that use.”233 This
unrestricted freedom of access was based on the tacit permission given by
humankind—as the ocean’s communal owners—given that (pollution-free)
navigation benefits wider community interests.234 In another example, he posited
that coastal development is permitted because “it is lawful to build upon the shore
if it may be without the hurt of the rest.”235 Therefore, he did not promote a
general “freedom” of high seas fishing under some kind of liberal system
permitting the private accumulation of unclaimed property, but rather that fishing
might be tacitly accepted by the international community as a free activity, given
that fish stocks were—at that time, at least—seen as essentially inexhaustible.236
Naturally, in the face of industrial-scale fishing and the decimation of global fish
227
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should abstain from another’s.”); HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM 1609-2009 55 (Robert Feenstra
ed.., 2009) (1609); ROSSI, supra note 225, at 19.
GROTIUS, supra note 227, at 53.
Id.
HUGO GROTIUS, FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE
PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE 27 (James Brown ed., Ralph V.D. Magoffin trans., 1916) (1609).
Id.
Schrijver, supra note 96, at 1254.
GROTIUS, supra note 230, at 26–27 (“[I]f any of those things by nature may be occupied, that may
so far forth become the occupant’s as by such occupation the common use be not hindered.”).
Id. at 33 (“If any should forbid another to take fire from his fire . . . and light from his light, by the
law of human society I would accuse and sue him to condemnation.”).
Id. at 27.
Schrijver & Prislan, supra note 226, at 176; GROTIUS, supra note 230, at 38 (“If a man were to enjoin
other people from fishing, he would not escape the reproach of monstrous greed.”).
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stocks four hundred years later, this tacit approval of unrestricted appropriation
of fisheries would patently no longer exist.
Recent reinterpretations of the Mare Liberum therefore suggest that pro-flag
state theorists have, over the years, considerably skewed the concept of the
freedom of the seas.237 As Vid Prislan and Nico Schrijver put it, Grotius’s
arguments “later digressed into ‘first come, first served’ advantages for
industrialized nations.”238 It is, therefore, not surprising that the two dominantmaritime nations, that have held hegemonic regulatory power over the oceans
since 1805, have promoted a distinctly Anglo-American model of liberal
regulation. This model relies on minimal state intervention and the promotion of
anarchic self-governance, thus permitting U.K. and U.S. interests to profit
considerably from this “free” maritime domination.239 This is the unfortunate
entrenchment of the “free-for-all” interpretation of ocean law, which will continue
to suit the dominant maritime powers in each regional ocean zone. It has also
been suggested that the misinterpreted “freedom of the seas” did not actually
come to dominate until the Industrial Revolution in the mid-19th century.240
Before this, it was actually John Selden’s argument in favor of territorial
appropriation and intensive national regulation that ruled international thinking.241
Unsurprisingly, this was throughout the era that witnessed the ascendency and
indoctrination of Westphalianism and the centering of all regulatory power in the
hands of nation-states. Wherein, as a necessary corollary, all law without national
territory was viewed as lex nullius.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Story exemplified this liberal model of law in
1826, when he adjudged that “[u]pon the ocean, in time of peace, all possess an
entire equality. It is the common highway of all, appropriated to the use of all, and
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U.N. Secretariat, Memorandum on the Regime of the High Seas, Memorandum by the Secretariat,
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Schrijver & Prislan, supra note 226, at 206. For example, in 1950, Lauterpacht defined it as ensuring
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Hersch Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 376, 407 (1950).
R.P. ANAND, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA, 152–53 (1983). Anand notes
that the “hallmark of this law, ever since its acceptance in the early nineteenth century, has been, in
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Id. at 152.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 228–29. Anand notes how Selden “won this protracted ‘battle’ not by the brilliance of his
arguments, but by the ‘louder voice’ of the powerful British Navy.” Id. at 229. In fact, the idea and
concern that the ocean can be enclosed by dominant maritime powers is one which has existed for
millennia. See e.g., Rossi, supra note 225, at 39–41.
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no one can vindicate to himself a superior or exclusive prerogative there.”242 And,
a century later, the Permanent Court of Justice, in the Lotus Case, still understood
that:
[v]essels on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of the State
whose flag they fly. In virtue of the principle of the freedom of the
seas, that is to say, the absence of any territorial sovereignty upon the
high seas, no State may exercise any kind of jurisdiction over foreign
vessels upon them.243
In other words, if there is no territorial or non-flag state that is permitted to
impose unilateral regulation in open ocean waters, then the only alternative under
an international system must be the state that is embodied in the vessel itself. This
understanding that either territorial states or flag states govern the seas continues
to the present day.244 As R.P. Anand states, over the past two centuries, it became
“accepted as an indisputable, almost sacred, dogma which was supposed to be in
the interest of all mankind and which nobody would dare challenge.”245 Its total
transmogrification can, for example, be witnessed in Bo Johnson Theutenberg’s
words, who understood it as meaning that the ocean is “open and free for the use
of all nations,” where “[n]o nation could prevent another from carrying on
traditional activities at sea”:246 a far cry from the system of common society and
pooled interests promoted by Grotius.
These accounts of the freedom of the seas became corrupted for one very
simple reason: if only nation-states have exclusive and unencumbered regulatory
power, but coastal states do not have territorial dominion, then only flag states are
left as the option for national legal control of the high seas. By its very design,
Westphalianism is innately antagonistic to any possible suggestions of “shared”
governance over a territorial space. Furthermore, given that states are “equals”
and free to act in self-interest, they cannot be compelled to accept shared ownership
of the ocean’s resources. Therefore, under the Westphalian “inter-state”
regulatory system, the only two choices for the “sovereign-free” high seas were
either lawlessness or regulation by distant flag states.
In sum, by promoting a system that sees the ocean as a gift to the global
community and shared by all, Grotius’s argument in favor of turning the ocean
into a global commons was in fact highly analogous to Arvid Pardo’s famous 1967
appeal to turn much of the seas into the “Common Heritage of Mankind” and to
foreclose the ocean from ever-increasing national territorialization and
242
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unilateralism.247 This engaging vision aimed to bring the entire community of
humankind within the frame of ocean governance and, out of necessity, sought to
redefine and mollify the territoriality of ocean space and the politically exclusive
nature of all the ocean’s interconnected zones, including the territorial sea.248 Such
a new and holistic global commons management model has thus been covered,
with some social scientists concurring that the failed understanding of Grotius
seems to come in failing to distinguish between “common access” and “common
property.”249 As a result, the nation-state should no longer be seen as the only
representative agent of humankind’s shared ocean and as the only source of
transnational legal power.

B. The Fault of “Flag” States or Flag “States”?
The political tug-of-war between states to resolve the exclusive sovereign
rights and freedoms inside hard borders in ocean space is primarily built on the
economic ambitions of sovereign states and often plays out through diplomacy,
political posturing, and displays of military power.250 As Daniel Cheever puts it,
“[n]owhere is the indissoluble relationship between politics and law demonstrated
more cogently than in the law of the sea.”251 The outmoded debate between the
two original competing systems of governance—between flag state regulation or
territorial state encroachment—is often couched in the language of a normative
debate over the more suitable, effective, and customary system for managing the
seas. A closer look at the contested negotiations, however, makes clear that the
debate has never been about which mode of governance is more effective, but about
which ultimately delivers the propounding state the greatest amount of wealth,
opportunity, and power. Indeed, the growing tension between the U.S. and China
in the South China Sea is really a defense of the right of states to navigate trade,
247
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conduct military operations, and prevent coastal exploitation of a resource-rich
region, rather than any justified defense of the quality of flag state regulation as
the most effective system of marine governance.252
The same can be seen in reverse, where arguments promoting the rightful
placement of coastal state “jurisdiction” are really a masked promotion of coastal
state power and ownership of distant resources, regardless of the environmental
protection challenges this entails. For example, negotiations over the UNESCO
2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage were
hopelessly distracted by this same contest between the flag states and the coastal
states.253 The negotiators hardly touched the subject of “which is more effective” in
terms of protecting the cultural heritage of the ocean. Instead, most of the time
and political energy was focused on suspicions about the underhanded
motivations and power aspirations of the “opposing” side.254 As a result, despite
increased coastal state jurisdiction for protecting underwater cultural heritage in
the EEZ being better on practical grounds, it was ultimately blocked by flag states
who were distrustful of the motivations of coastal states, referring to their
proposals disparagingly as “taking another bite at the jurisdictional apple.”255
In many senses, flag state regulation—built around the aforementioned
notion of liberalism and laissez-faire regulation of broad ocean space—has been the
preferred ocean governance model for the states who stand to gain the most.
Those powerful Western maritime nations—who accumulated considerable
wealth and opportunity through colonial expansion and domination of the world’s
transcontinental trade networks—are the same powerful nations who have
conveniently designed today’s liberal flag state-based model of ocean
management. The result is that, when levelling criticisms against the failing law of
the sea, the vast majority of international law scholars have, up to now, aimed
their cannons upon the over-reliance on “flag state jurisdiction” or upon the areas
where this flag state regulation needs tweaking. Consequently, in recent decades,
many theorists and policymakers have promoted a system with far greater
252
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prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction for coastal and port states in order to
overcome the weaknesses of distant flag state regulation.256
This approach—which increases coastal and port state regulation in the
international law of the sea framework—has certainly provided a number of
important improvements. For example, it has put much greater pressure upon the
dominant flag states or upon flags-of-convenience to raise their standards in order
to maintain access for their fleets to certain ports.257 The difficulty, however,
remains that coastal and port states also suffer from the same symptoms of
Westphalian sovereignty—such as inter-state competition, races to the bottom,
and the exclusive freedom to externalize global responsibility.258 In other words,
the risk of further territorialization and encroachment by coastal states is just as
undesirable as a laissez-faire model of distant and disinterested regulation by
disconnected flag states.
Indeed, the emphasis on internal interests rather than the collective interests
of humankind means that public laws governing port and coastguard authorities
usually emphasize criminal activities of national interest, such as inward
smuggling, market distortion, and migrant trafficking, above distant
environmental concerns.259 As the Task Force on Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated Fishing on the High Seas reported, not only are domestic
enforcement agencies unaware of the true global costs, but any public expenditure
by a state on criminal prosecution for activities having an impact beyond national
jurisdiction is not recouped.260 Other practical factors also make non-flag states
equally awkward as regulators, such as the physical challenges of interdiction and
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inspection, the difficulty with surveillance, and the pressure to avoid additional
delays and disruption in port.261
For the very same reasons, market and transit states also make
uncomfortable and ineffective regulators.262 What is more, particularly on account
of processing supply chain and transshipment practices, it is difficult to isolate
imports that breach environmental standards.263 They also have considerable
difficulty regulating grey or black markets and are at constant risk of falling foulof-trade protectionism rules.264 Home states, that have jurisdiction over their own
nationals when in home-state territory, are also too distanced from the specific
activities and are unsuitable prosecutorial enforcers or receptors of incriminating
evidence.265 Indeed, in recent unverified reports of looting from the Battle of
Jutland wrecks by converted trawlers in the North Sea, it appears that numerous
port, coastal, and flag states are implicated, but none have shown a willingness to
fully invest in the security of wrecks more strongly valued by Britain and
Germany.266 Even in their position as a home state, the British authorities did not
appear to have prosecuted a U.K. national reported to have been involved in the
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illicit activities,267 despite this state having recognized the need to proactively
protect such underwater cultural heritage.268
Critically, therefore, none of these states—whether flag, port, coastal,
market, transit, or national—can avoid the same weaknesses of national
sovereignty. They can commonly refuse consent to any international law which
does not provide them—and only them—with a political gain on balance. In other
words, they require considerable political or economic incentives before they
invest the political and economic resources in the punishment of offenders or in
restricting their own economic activity in deference to external interests.269
Furthermore, even if these states did accept maximal jurisdictional responsibility,
they would still stand to gain from competing in the provision of lax regulation
and apathetic enforcement.
Understood from this perspective, the sovereign freedom of deficient flag
state systems to profit from lax regulation, rather than the use of flag state systems,
lies at the heart of the law of the sea’s underlying weakness. Certainly, increased
regulation across all the governance nodes would significantly notch-up standards
in specific areas and force flag states to join collective standards’ arrangements.
The underlying fault, however, lies in the inability to coerce states, flag or
otherwise, to modify their behavior in a manner against their own interests, as well
as prohibiting states from externalizing global “losses” and not in the use of flag
state regulation per se.

V. A T RANSNATIONAL L AW OF THE S EA
The focus of this article has been to pinpoint the causes of the legal system’s
failure to manage the oceans, as opposed to introducing every element of a new
paradigm of governance. As such, it is beyond its purview to give a comprehensive
account of a needed transnational law of the sea. While a detailed global vision of
transnational ocean governance would be too large for the current discussion, this
Section provides an overview of some important elements within such a system,
exploring some of their advantages when productively eclipsing or interoperating
with existing inter-state legal systems. Subsection A highlights recent academic
efforts to explicate a model of Integrated Ocean Management (IOM), which many
have regarded as merely a search for an ecosystems-oriented model of governance.
It should, in fact, be largely understood, more simply, as a search for a post267
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Westphalian model of ocean management. Then, building on previous sections,
Subsection B suggests that multi-stakeholder inclusivity and multi-level
governance are two primary features of such a transnational law of the sea.

A. Understanding Integrated Ocean Management as a Demand
for a Transnational Law of the Sea
While the root causes are rarely examined, it in fact appears well-accepted
that the problem with ocean governance lies with the system itself, rather than with
the legal rules contained within. For example, during detailed studies between 2010
and 2015 by the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues
Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity
Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Working Group), there was
consistent pessimism about the inevitably poor implementation or the likely
dilution of any resulting commitments between states, rather than the content of
any agreed rules.270 As a result, the BBNJ Working Group urged the need for
better cooperation and coordination between “all sectors and all levels,”
conceding that “a global universal governance structure remained the best way to
promote sustainable marine biodiversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction.”271
This gloomy allusion to the present system of law—highlighting concern for
compliance, implementation, and enforcement of international agreements, or
with pervasive regulatory, normative, or geographical gaps—has also become an
increasingly vocalized issue among academics more broadly. For example, David
Vousden says that “many leading experts on high seas and ocean governance are
now convinced that . . . there is now an urgent need for a transformation to a
more suitable legal regime which is more cross-sectoral and integrated in its
management approaches and strategies.”272 As Freestone summarizes, therefore,
“virtually all are in agreement . . . that we need far more effective means of
enforcing compliance with the norms and structures than we have.”273 In effect,
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it appears to be almost unanimous that there is a need for better institutional
structures, systems, and processes in the governance model itself.274
In response to these widely reported systemic issues in the present model,
there has been increasingly widespread calls for an approach built around far
greater “integration” or, in other words, for IOM.275 It is not just global
institutions and accords that are relaying these calls for integration across the legal
landscape but also academics.276 For example, in 2008, Yoshifumi Tanaka wrote
how “international documents tend to stress the importance of a holistic approach
by referring to [IOM].”277 Many others have been equally clear on the need for a
new paradigm within IOM.278 As Wright and his colleagues recently reported,
“[m]any States, scientific experts and civil society groups have . . . repeatedly
highlighted the need for integrated ocean governance.”279 Yet, despite its undisputed
central placement on the global agenda, the actual meaning, content, and
envisioned structure of this new integrated approach to ocean management
remains remarkably undefined and under-examined.280
It certainly appears that IOM is at least concerned with the holistic
management of the ocean as one large interdependent—and, indeed,
transnational—ecosystem.281 By understanding the placement of humans as an
integral aspect of this interconnected ocean network, many see IOM as almost a
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synonym for “ecosystems-based management.”282 This, in essence, demands that
all governance be founded upon a highly relational (interdependent), eco-centric,
and cumulative understanding of long-term impacts of marine activities upon all
stakeholders.283 Most also concur that IOM’s meaning is rarely fixed, but is actually
highly context-dependent.284 It is, therefore, better understood as an amassing
collection of principles and processes to be called upon depending on the specific
context, challenge, or circumstance in focus.285 Karen Scott, for example, draws
upon various environmental principles and marine planning processes being used
in various regions and nations across the world.286 Similarly, Elizabeth Kirk argues
that an approach is needed which “combines both principle and process.”287 A
brief review of the literature, however, suggests that IOM is likely to include many
of the general environmental principles, such as sustainable development,
intergenerational and intragenerational equity, ecosystem services, common but
differentiated responsibilities, access and benefit sharing, precautionary
management, and the polluter pays principle—as well as containing other more
general principles such as public participation, transparency, and accountability.
In addition to these principles, numerous governance processes can be utilized in
order to achieve better integration, such as marine spatial planning, marine
protected areas, environmental impact assessments, integrated coastal zone
management, co-management, and various collaborative models of governance.
Many authors also understand IOM’s purpose as ultimately bridging the
specific “gaps” in ocean governance which continuously appear. Barnes’s
approach, for example, classified IOM as providing normative, spatial, sectoral,
temporal, disciplinary, and user integration.288 Similarly, the BBNJ Working Group
viewed IOM as bridging regulation, implementation, governance, coordination,
and information sharing gaps.289 Further, although Tanaka broke IOM down into
ecological, normative, and implementation vectors, his definition narrowly
focused on institutional or agency coordination and, thus, largely excluded the
282

283
284
285
286
287
288
289

See Jakobsen, supra note 201, at 293–96; see also Scott, supra note 4, at 465; TANAKA, supra note 15,
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Understanding, 14 J. ENV’T POL’Y & PLAN. 81 (2012); cf. Oanta, supra note 16, at 226 (suggesting that
IOM necessitates end-to-end regulation, in order to improve cohesion and harmony across the
regulatory framework).
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See Scott, supra note 4, at 466–67.
See generally id.; Kirk, supra note 274.
See generally Scott, supra note 4.
Kirk, supra note 274, at 33.
See Barnes, supra note 278, at 860–62.
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Informal Working Group to the President of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/67/95, ¶¶ 34,
42 (June 13, 2012).
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various gaps that arise when looking more closely at the vital stakeholder level. 290
As demonstrated in Section III.D, however, most ocean governance gaps can, in
fact, be clearly linked back to the international system of law. Moreover, studies
into transnational law and governance are often seen as a means to improve upon
these same weaknesses of the international legal system itself.291 Ergo, in order to
address the gaps in ocean governance, a focus on achieving effective transnational
law and governance is needed.
Nevertheless, despite some commentators casually noting the transnational
characteristics of the oceans292 and calling for solutions that capture transboundary
activity from end-to-end,293 there has been a dearth of literature in the law of the
sea field making the crucial connection between transnational law, as a broad
discipline and field of study, with the coveted principles and processes of IOM.294
This is surprising and regretful given that the same weaknesses of the international
law of the sea that are universally lamented—such as the need for an expanded
role of supranational, private, and non-state laws, actors, and systems operating
more fluidly at transnational scales—are almost identical to those same
weaknesses that the transnational legal discipline seeks to address. More so, given
that, in its normative guise, transnational law seeks to achieve a multi-level,
holistic, and inclusive system of law in response to global regulatory challenges.
As a result, any proposed model of IOM should incorporate the theories,
processes, and approaches of transnational law and governance.

B. A Transnational Law of the Sea: Multi -Stakeholder
Inclusivity and Multi-Level Governance
At the very heart of the coveted “integrated” model of ocean governance is
the consistent desire for both greater stakeholder inclusivity and for increased multilevel regime-building. In other words, the desire to truly bring the global community
of persons beyond states—the unfortunately titled “non-state actors”—into
positions of governance authority, as well as to release some of the grip on legal
authority by national governments and displace it to governance networks found
at local, national, regional, and global scales. In fact, this ideal of post-national
290
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governance accords neatly with Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s visionary 1998
monograph, The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource, which
promoted a new global approach to ocean governance.295 The same recognition
could perhaps also be attributed to Allott’s thesis on the Mare Nostrum in 1992,
which touched on the case for a human-centered and post-Westphalian approach
to ocean governance296—indeed, as well as Grotius’s Mare Liberum over four
centuries ago.

1. Multi-stakeholder inclusivity
In every case, one can locate stakeholder participation—and the capacity of
ocean users at all levels both within and without the state to effectively and
productively communicate, cooperate, coordinate, and collaborate—at the heart
of the IOM approach. For example, even under those headings that are discernibly
regulatory in focus, such as the need for normative frameworks which cross
political boundaries, the same underlying motive is to address the conflicting and
overlapping interests of fragmented and dissociated communities.297 Barnes,
therefore, rightly summarizes that a “truly integrated approach” would empower
stakeholders to be engaged in the regulation process.298 It is possible to detect
these same common themes throughout social scientific research that seeks to
improve upon the presently beleaguered model of Westphalian law.299 Research
and associated policies dedicated to expanding public participation have,
therefore, proliferated in recent years, with the principle of civil-society inclusivity
becoming something of a revolutionary movement.300
Environmental public participation can range from small-scale local resource
management to the representation of global communities and interest groups at

295
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297
298
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international fora.301 It can also come in many forms: from a simple requirement
to improve public information and transparency of decisionmakers to
consultations with affected individuals and communities in the development of
new legislation, to full-scale regulatory management of public goods by private
actors.302 There are also many representative forms of the global demos, such as:
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including charities, advocacy networks,
and interest groups all operating at the national, regional, and global levels;
corporations and other enterprises, also operating at or across the local, national,
regional, and global scales; epistemic (or “expert”) communities and standards
bodies, across all levels; and all communities and individual humans themselves.303
In all cases, there is clear evidence that an expanded demos has been effective
in enhancing the protection of the ocean. There are numerous examples where
the progress toward post-national representation in global governance is at last
providing solutions to the ocean’s paradigmatic transnational context. Such
examples include: the increased stakeholder participation in marine planning or
environmental protection systems;304 enhanced subsidiarity of biodiversity
management and protection;305 expansion of international legal standing to private
actors and NGOs;306 integration of stakeholder groups into governance networks;
public-private partnerships or advisory bodies;307 utilization of private
communities and NGOs within the governance mix;308 utilization of maritime
301

302
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& ENV’T 146, 148–49 (2015); TAMARA TSCHENTSCHER, PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
THROUGH MORE EFFECTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE:
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See supra notes 299–301 and accompanying text.
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communities in improving security measures;309 and the facilitation of
coordination and information exchange across epistemic communities310 or
private and subnational actor networks.311

2. Multi-level governance
It similarly becomes essential, therefore, that multi-level governance
(MLG)—governance that is intentionally arranged as interlinking and overlapping
regimes at different spatial levels or scales at the global, regional, national, and
local community level—should provide both the descriptive and normative frame
for understanding the coveted stakeholder-inclusive model. Not only does MLG
provide an appealing vision for a simple response to the complex challenges of
transnational governance and provide avenues toward greater stakeholder
inclusivity, but it also helps clarify the roles and functions of the state and of nonstate actors within the governance framework.312 In fact, a multi-stakeholder
approach naturally calls for a multi-level approach, given that most actors beyond
the state are characteristically found above or below the national level.313 It appears
clear that such a multi-level approach is sought in the attainment of integrated
governance. Indeed, the International Union on the Conservation of Nature Draft
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International Covenant,314 Rio Declaration,315 and Agenda 21316 each call
unequivocally for action at all levels—international, regional, national, and local—
in order to effectively achieve sustainable development. MLG thus becomes a
necessary byproduct of the worldwide search for governance beyond government.
Indeed, the interdependence of all stakeholders in the shared ocean
commons leads to a widespread tradition of externalities and spillover effects,
resulting in underproduction by nation-states in work toward global objectives.
MLG can therefore resolve these collective action failures by integrating states
into regimes or processes that delegate decision making authority and
accountability to more suitable levels, such as through local, regional, or global
regimes, where international law is failing to produce global public goods.317 It also
permits states to pass technical management and administrative responsibility for
global goods onto more appropriate external agents and non-state actors,318 or
even to pass on the blame for stringent social and environmental policies.319
Furthermore, the centralization of responsibility can actually enhance, rather than
diminish, the capacity of civil society to press for changes to policies, by creating
a clearer and more familiar target for political lobbying.320
The above can be evidenced in the ocean governance context. An illustrative
example is the sustainable management of global fish stocks. It is true that certain
epistemic communities (for example, the International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea or the International Union on the Conservation of

314
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Nature),321 standards bodies (for example, the Marine Stewardship Council or the
U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization),322 or advocacy NGOs (for example,
Oceana, Greenpeace or the World Wildlife Fund)323 are more efficiently organized
by providing data, technical rules, standards, schemes, and political pressure at a
global level. However, it is also necessary to leave sufficient latitude to local
communities to develop their own rules and systems for preventing or recycling
bycatch or allocating fishing zones between local stakeholders with the efficient
use of the guidance, tools, enforcement architecture, and resources which are
provided from higher levels.324 Thus, higher levels can be used to overcome the
accepted limitations of national enforcement, by encouraging or sidestepping
state-level implementation.325
In addition to having the global governance level bolstered by strategic
public-private partnerships expanded participative democracy,326 it is particularly
the regional level that has continuously proven itself to be indispensable within
effective ocean governance models. Regional-level governance carries many
advantages, by lowering the critical mass needed before significant commitments
can be made in cross-border negotiations, as well as providing for a more
harmonized and coherent system of management for a large body of water.327 As
such, there are countless success stories in the protection of the marine
environment driven by regional networks and organizations, such as through the
Barcelona Convention,328 Antarctic Treaty System,329 Baltic Marine Environment
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Protection Commission (or Helsinki Commission),330 the OSPAR Commission,331
and numerous other regimes, such as those under the U.N. Regional Seas
Programme.332 There is also the enhanced level of protection and stock
management derived by regional fisheries management organizations333 and global
improvements in general flag state compliance as a result of closed regional
systems of port state measures, such as the Paris Memorandum of
Understanding.334 Furthermore, based on the analyses above, the more that states
are willing to acquiesce national sovereignty across regional contexts, the more
effective and powerful the resulting regimes can become. For example, the highly
supranational European Union has made several noteworthy achievements in the
marine governance context and is regarded as a world-leader in this field, including
extensive improvements in pollution and waste management, fisheries,
transboundary spatial planning, maritime security, and biodiversity protection.335
This makes sense when one considers that the creation of an overarching system
of accountability above states will have the capacity to drive higher levels of state
compliance and a wider servitude to regional objectives.336
For all these reasons, it is understandable that the present negotiations over
an international legally-binding instrument to protect biodiversity beyond national
jurisdiction (BBNJ) have included discussions on a “hybrid” global-regional
approach.337 An efficient system of MLG would therefore handle the complexity
and polycentricity of different governance polities, with numerous public, private,
and hybrid actors operating at different levels and playing different roles
330
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depending on the precise issue in question.338 To be effective, MLG must also use
an appropriate mix of centralization and decentralization, to permit autonomous
and meaningful community self-governance at the right levels.339
MLG is thus understood as the vital provision of polycentric coordination
within Transnational Environmental Governance, given this field’s concern “with
the migration and impact of legal norms, rules and models across borders.”340 As
Campbell and her colleagues suggested in 2016, an
explanation for failed oceans governance is scalar mismatch; that is, a
governance intervention . . . not well matched to the ecological scale of the
feature or process being governed . . . . The concern for scalar mismatch fuels
support for governance at global or regional scales and coordination among
scales.341

However, rather than viewing MLG as merely the realignment of scalar mismatch
between eco-systems and governance systems, we must be clear that the marine
environment continues to suffer severe scalar mismatch across normative,
regulatory, jurisdictional, collaborative, and compliance systems as well.

VI. C ONCLUSION : L OOKING B EYOND THE H ORIZONTALISM
Ascending up the rigging to the crow’s nest atop our new globalized world
order and peering through the spyglass, it is clear that coming into view beyond
the horizon is a new paradigm of ocean governance. While sovereignty and
territoriality may continue to rule the waves for some time, any suggestion that
this system of global legal accountability is working for the protection of our
shared global ocean must at last be jettisoned. Instead, it is time to consciously
expand beyond the horizontalism and decentralism of the present inter-national law
of the sea, by focusing on building more forceful systems of legal accountability
above, below, within, and without the nation-state. The failure to govern the oceans
has less to do with Grotius’s res communis or flag state regulation per se, as it does
with our gripped obsession with legal positivism and the eternal truism of
sovereign exclusivity, equality, and territoriality. All three of these features of
national sovereignty—which remain resolute and ever-present in our global legal
order for the seas—have manifested a list of critical weaknesses in the
management of an incredibly complex, multi-leveled, prototypically transnational,
338

339
340

341
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intergenerational, fluid, interdependent, and reflexive global commons, that itself
remains accessible and open to rivalry from all directions.
There has been a distinct lack of criticism of our present international legal
system for governing the seas, despite the huge expanse of research which has
flourished in the fields of transnational law and governance, global legal pluralism,
global governance, and multi-level governance. Fortunately, the time is ripe to
adapt the principles, findings, and theories across these subject fields for use
within the marine environment. The time for reflecting on our presently
Westphalian “constitution for the oceans”—as epitomized by the 1982 LOSC—
therefore appears to have been upon us for some time. While some law of the sea
experts have dispassionately inferred that this may require a “new paradigm
beyond positivism,”342 there has been a lack of conviction and concerted research
towards this end.343 Perhaps the best effort thus far has been Tanaka’s 2008
monograph on a regionally oriented understanding of “integrated” management
for the oceans that, although appearing to have slipped past the radar of wider
academic discussions, did at last highlight the weaknesses of a sole reliance on the
LOSC.344
Yet, it is clear that ocean jurisprudence continues to proceed along the same
tired inter-national lines. For example, the current negotiations over an
internationally binding legal instrument on the protection of BBNJ appear to carry
the same weaknesses of inter-state consent-based bargaining and lowest common
denominator weaknesses which were lamented throughout this article.345 More
investment is needed in the mobilization and advancement of private and hybrid
actors, such as NGOs, transnational corporations, subnational actors, and
standards bodies, as well as effective supranational and regional institutions, which
are able to force meaningful consent and compliance across ocean space.
Far more can be discussed on the expansion of pluralistic, multi-stakeholder,
and multi-level systems of maritime law and governance, as well as the means of
achieving such a global system of regulation. Nevertheless, this article has focused
an early critical point in these discussions, by arguing that the worldwide search
among academics and experts over the past three decades for new “integrated”
modes of ocean governance has, in fact, been merely a calling for a new postWestphalian, multi-level, and stakeholder-inclusive governance regime. In other
words, the coveted search for an integrated ocean governance is a search for a new
transnational law of the sea. The principal feature of this new transnational
governance model is an advanced level of stakeholder participation in the
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governance framework, as well as the migration of normative regimes from a
stubbornly horizontal system toward a multi-layered and polycentric network of
legal rule-makers and takers.
The integration and coordination between the traditional inter-national
order of the oceans, as epitomized and constitutionalized through the LOSC, with
the emerging seaward migration of a new transnational understanding of global
governance, is a ripe area for future research. The first port of call would be to
finally identify our outmoded devotion to Westphalianism as being at the heart of
our failing system up to now. If we are ever to govern this blue planet effectively,
a transnational law of the sea is not just desirable—it is indispensable.
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